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DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS IN PRISON
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS: THE APPLICATION
OF THE GOLDBERG BALANCING TEST
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."' However, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is a statement of a broad general prin-
ciple; it does not codify the steps needed to satisfy due process in
particular factual situations. Due process is a flexible concept that
must be applied according to the weight of the interests of the
parties involved.2 Such a weighing process in itself does not quan-
tify due process requirements for any given factual situation. The
weight given to the interests of a party is determined instead by
the values of the individuals who .make up the tribunal applying
the balancing test.3 It is the goal of this note to interpret recent
cases dealing with prison disciplinary proceedings in a manner that
will illuminate the difficulties encountered in applying due process
safeguards. In order for such a discussion to be meaningful, this
note will first examine the general area of procedural due process
in administrative decision making. This discussion will be followed
by a theoretical analysis of those recent court decisions in admini-
strative law that are relevant to due process requirements in pri-
son administrative proceedings. The final section of this note will
briefly discuss the due process requirements that must accompany
the transfer of an inmate from one prison institution to another.
I. DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. DuE PROCESS IN GENERAL
Administrative law is an area in which non-judicial control is
exercised by a group of individuals responsible for formulating pol-
l. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within Its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
3. See text accompanying notes 112 to 114 ftfra,
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icies and making decisions for the purposes of carrying out a gov-
ernmental function.' When such decision making tends to deprive
persons of life, liberty, or property, the procedures involved must
afford the parties due process of law. What due process may re-
quire varies with the factual situation involved.5
In administrative proceedings, due process often calls for a
hearing prior to the rendering of a decision by the administrative
body. A hearing is a "proceeding before a tribunal" which can be
a trial-type hearing, an argument-type hearing, or a combination
of trial and argument-hearing procedures.6 In deciding what type
of procedure is required, one must look to three factors: (1) whether
legislative or adjudicative facts are involved; (2) when a hearing
should be held; and, (3) what procedural safeguards will be used
in the actual hearing process.7
1. Legislative and Adjudicative Facts
First, one must look at the significance of the terms legislative
and adjudicative facts. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis indicates that
adjudicative facts are those which should not be determined with-
out giving the party who is being deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, a trial-type hearing. Adjudicative facts are those about which
an individual is likely to have more knowledge than an administra-
tor. They tend to answer the questions of who, what, why, when,
and where.8 Legislative facts, on the other hand, are those which
go into the formulation of broad policy decisions made by an ad-
ministrative organization. These facts do not lend themselves to ob-
servations by a single individual but are more concerned with a
general body of information that can be formulated by research and
argument-type hearings.9
Since prison disciplinary proceedings are a type of administra-
tive decision making, an example of legislative and adjudicative
facts in the prison setting may clarify this distinction. If an ad-
ministrative unit within a prison makes a decision that inmates
should not smoke while working in the kitchen because of the
health hazards involved, such a decision is based on legislative facts.
However, if an administrative disciplinary committee within a pri-
son is determining whether a certain inmate was involved in a
4. Y. DAVIS, ADMINISMATrVr LAW TEXT § 1.01 (3d ed. 1972).
5. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
6. K. DAVIS, supra note 4, at § 7.01.
7. See K. DAVIS, supra note 4, at §§ 7.01 et 8eq.
8. K. DAVIS, supra note 4, at § 7.03.
9. An argument-type hearing is distinguished from a trial-type hearing In that the
former involves a presentation of ideas and arguments while the latter involves a pre-
sentation of evidence. An argument-type hearing can take the form of a written brief, an
oral argument, or a combination of the two. Id. at § 7.01.
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fight, it must consider adjudicative facts. As previously mentioned,
adjudicative facts generally call for a trial-type hearing. Professor
Davis describes a trial type hearing as follows:
A "trial" is a process by which parties present evidence,
subject to cross examination and rebuttal, and the tribunal
makes a determination on the record. The key to a trial is
opportunity of each party to know and to meet the evidence
and the argument on the other side. . . . The opportunity
to meet the opposing evidence and argument includes op-
portunity to present evidence, to present written or oral ar-
gument or both, and to cross-examine opposing witnesses. o
It is quite apparent that the prison disciplinary proceeding describ-
ed in the hypothetical situation involves a determination of adjudi-
cative facts. If one assumes that the disciplinary proceeding is like-
ly to deprive the inmate of life, liberty, or property, and that the
inmate does not admit he was involved in a fight; then it neces-
sarily follows that a trial-type hearing is a due process requirement.
However, to take this over-simplistilc view would be to ignore the
qualifying factors involved in determining the standard of due pro-
cess to be applied in a given situation.
The due process safeguard of a strict trial-type hearing to de-
termine adjudicative facts is sometimes qualified by other circum-
stances. Under emergency situations or other important circum-
stances, administrative decisions may be made summarily, subject
to a hearing within a reasonable time.1' An overriding governmen-
tal interest is another factor that will at times limit an individual's
right to a trial-type hearing.'2 In these instances, something less
than a trial-type hearing will satisfy due process.' s
2. When Should a Hearing be Held?
As a general rule, summary proceedings by a court, dealing
with adjudicative facts affecting a Fourteenth Amendment right,
can be made whenever the governmental interest in summary ad-
judication outweighs the recipient's interest in avoiding the loss.
Generally, courts will allow summary proceedings when the action
is only temporary14 or when an emergency situation dictates that
10. 1. at § 7.01.
11. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
12. Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). No hearing was re-
quired by due process when a short order cook was discharged from her Job at a naval
gun factory site because she was considered a "security risk."
13. The following two subsections will discuss the qualifying factors which may limit
some of the elements of a trial-type hearing.
14. See Direct Realty Co. v. Porter, 157 F.2d 434 (Em. App. 1946). In that case, due
process was not violated by a summary action because the complainant had an oppor-
tunity to protest the Summary action and to show why he should be given an oral hear-
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immediate action be taken. 15 A good example of a court ruling
that immediate action is necessary is the case of Fahey v. Mal-
lonee.16 In Fahey the Supreme Court held that an agency acted
properly in ordering a conservator to summarily take charge of a
bank, without giving the incumbent officers a prior hearing. The
court indicated that even though the issues called for a trial type
hearing, the "delicate nature of the institution" involved demanded
that summary action be taken pending a trial-type hearing.
Summary action is often taken by prison officials in prison
disciplinary proceedings. Prison officials work in an atmosphere
where riotous situations or great harm to inmates or guards may
result if swift action is not taken to control the inmate population
during emergency situations.1 7 In the case of Urbano v. McCorkle,18
the court held that due process safeguards were required whenever
a prisoner was subject to administrative or punitive segregation.
However, the court went on to say that:
[I1n times of emergency situations, such process may be
postponed and emergency action taken. But the prisoners
affected should thereafter be afforded within a reasonable
time the minimal due process that is stated above.19
There seems to be little conflict with the view that a prison ad-
ministrative body or officer may summarily lock an inmate in seg-
regation when a tense situation demands swift action to prevent
further trouble. 20 However, difficulties may sometimes arise due to
the prison administrator's concept of what represents a reasonable
delay in providing a hearing after summary procedures have been
taken.2
3. What Procedural Safeguards Does Due Process Require?
In discussing summary proceedings and the question of when
ing. To require an oral hearing in every case, would be too burdensome upon the rent con-
trol board. See also Jordan v. American, Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir.
1948) (opportunity for de novo court review after summary action satisfies due process).
15. North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). By statute, city
officials were authorized to summarily destroy spoiled food. Such food amounted to a
serious health hazard.
16. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
17. Biagiareli v. Sielaff, 349 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1972) ; Urbano v. McCorkle, 334
F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971).
18. Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971).
19. Id. at 168.
20. Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 349 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
21. In Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971), the court suggested that,
if summary action is taken, the prisoners should be afforded due process within a reason-
able time. This seems to suggest a delay of a few days at most. A somewhat different
holding was reached in Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. dented, VI04
U.S. 1062 (1972) where the court held that a hearing six months after confinement in
segregation was not unreasonable, Burns appears to be a minority view.
678
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a hearing is demanded by due process, a balancing of interests be-
tween the government and the party involved is the most important
consideration. Likewise, when determining what aspects of a strict
trial-type hearing are necessary, another balancing of interests takes
place. The Supreme Court has described this balancing test in the
following terms:
"Due Process" is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries
are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific
factual contexts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudi-
cate or make binding determinations which directly affect
the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those
agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been
associated with the judicial process. . . Whether the Con-
stitution requires that a particular right obtain in a spe-
cific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The
nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the pro-
ceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all
considerations which must be taken into account.
22
The first aspect of this balancing test, "the nature of the right
involved, '2 8 deals with determining whether the party subject to
the administrative decision has a constitutionally protected right at
stake. In order to require the procedural due process protection
of a trial-type hearing, the individual must be ". . . subject to
'grievous loss' at the hands of the state or its instrumentalities."u
Grievous loss has become an accepted standard for determining
whether a constitutional right is subject to deprivation at the hands
of an administrative decision-making body.2 5 This standard ignores
consideration of whether the individual's interest is something that
was previously classified as a "privilege" rather than a "right.
'26
The courts, in many areas of law, have seen fit to reject the
right-privilege doctrine. 27 This trend has been followed in federal
courts in the area' of prison disciplinary proceedings.2 8 In the case
of Clutchette v. Procunier,29 the court stated that a prisoner doesn't
have a vested right to determine the type of confinement he will
22. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
23. Id.
24. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
25. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. Id.
27. K. DAVIS, supra note 4, at § 7.13. The right-privilege doctrine deals with the con-
cept that a person with a sufficient right at stake deserves constitutional due process
protection. However, a person whose interest is a mere privilege or gratuity does not
receive constitutional protection.
28. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v.
Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). "The exaction of segregated confinement was onerous in-
deed, and the distinction between a "right' and a "privilege" . .. is nowhere more mean-
ingless than behind prison walls. The difficult question, as always, is what process was
due." Id. at 196.
29. Clutuhette v. Procunler, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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have while in prison or to determine the general types of privileges
that will be afforded to him. However, it is unrealistic to argue that
because of these factors a prisoner's interests are only privileges or
gratuities from the state and consequently deserve no constitutional
due process protections.3 0 "Any further restraints or deprivations in
excess of that inherent in the sentence and in the normal structure
of prison life should be subject to judicial scrutiny." 1 Such re-
straints or deprivations can adversely affect the inmate's length of
sentence, the amount of pay he receives, and the freedoms that he
enjoys within the prison setting.3 2 When these deprivations take on
the status of being a "grievous loss," the inmate must be afforded
procedural due process protection."
The second item mentioned by the Hannah court is "the nature
of the proceeding." 8 4 For balancing purposes it can be assumed
that all disciplinary proceedings deal with adjudicative facts that
lend themselves to a trial-type hearing.
The third aspect of the balancing test is "the possible burden on
that proceeding." 5 This takes into consideration the administrative
difficulties involved in providing a trial-type hearing for each party
who is subject to a decision that may cause "grievous loss." When
the burden of providing such a hearing outweighs the -interest of the
party to be tried, something less than a trial-type hearing will sat-
isfy the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause."
B. HEARING REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
PARTY SUBJECT TO "GRIEVOUS Loss"
In the 1970 case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 37 the United States Su-
preme Court made a decision in a welfare termination suit which
has been influential in many areas of administrative law 8 and has
been extensively cited by federal courts in determining the proper
due process safeguards to be applied in prison disciplinary proceed-
ings.8 9 Since the ramifications of this case are so important in
administrative law in general, and in prison disciplinary proceed-
30. Id. at 780.
31. Id., quoting Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 1968).
32. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 780 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
33. To a person not within a prison, such loss of rights may not seem too important.
However, the court indicates that to a prisoner such rights are extremely important and
that "proceedings [outside the walls of a prison] resulting in far less punitive conse-
quences must be attendant with elements of due process." Id.
34. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
35. Id.
36. K. DAVIs, supra note 4, at § 7.16.
37. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
38. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
39. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Krause v. Schmidt,
341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
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ings in particular, an extensive review of the Goldberg decision
will be presented.
1. The Factual Situation
The issue in Goldberg was whether the state could terminate
public assistance payments to a welfare recipient without providing
a prior hearing.4 0 At the time the suit was filed, financial assistance
to an individual could be terminated without any type of prior
notice or hearing. After the filing of the suit, the state and city
adopted procedures which would have provided the recipient with
notice and hearing prior to termination of benefits. The plaintiffs
then attacked these newly adopted procedures as being unsatisfac-
tory under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The order promulgated by the New York City Department of Social
Services can be summarized as follows: (1) the caseworker has
an informal discussion with the recipient; (2) the caseworker, if
he feels that termination is warranted, recommends this procedure
to a unit supervisor; (3) if the supervisor agrees, he notifies the
recipient of the reason for termination and further notifies him
that within seven days he can request review; (4) the recipient
can provide a written statement of why he feels that termination
is not warranted; (5) if the reviewing official affirms the termina-
tion, the recipient is informed by letter of the termination; (6)
a post-termination hearing can be requested before an independent
state hearing officer at which time the recipient can personally
appear, offer oral evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and have a
record made of the decision; and, (7) a recipient may seek judicial
review of an unfavorable decision after the hearing.
4 1
There was no dispute in Goldberg over whether adjudicative
facts were present; such facts are inherent in termination proceed-
ings. In addition, the parties had no dispute over the type of
hearing that due process required; both agreed that at some time
a full trial-type hearing would have to be held. The real dispute,
then, was whether the recipient could be proceeded against in
a summary type manner under the rules promulgated by the New
York City Department of Social Services. This issue involved a
balancing of the government's interest in summary proceedings
against the recipient's interest in avoiding the loss. The Supreme
Court formulated the main issue as follows: "Whether the Due
Process Clause requires that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary
hearing before the termination of benefits. ' 41
40. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
41. Id. at 258-60.
42. Id. at 260.
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2. The Reasoning of the Court
The Supreme Court began by discussing the District Court's
holding that "a pre-termination evidentiary hearing" was necessary
to satisfy due process in the area of welfare termination even
though a post-termination "fair hearing" would be held later. I8 The
court went on to say that:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may
be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss' and depends upon
whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.
Accordingly, as we said in Cafeteria Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), 'consideration of
what procedures due process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the
precise nature of the government function involved as well
as of the private interest that has been affected by govern-
mental action.'"
The Court next discussed the fact "that some governmental
benefits may be administratively terminated without affording the
recipient a pre-termination evidentiary hearing." 5 However the
balancing process in this case tipped the weight of the scales
toward the welfare recipient. The Court emphasized that a major
consideration in the balancing process in this factual situation was
that when a welfare recipient's assistance is terminated, "his situ-
ation becomes immediately desperate," because he "lacks [the]
independent resources" necessary to live on while he awaits the
decision in the post-termination evidentiary hearing.4 6 The Supreme
Court therefore agreed with the District Court that a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing was needed and further agreed that such a
hearing "need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial
trial.""7
3. Due Process Requirements
The Court acknowledged that since a pre-termination hearing
was to be followed by a "full administrative review," and since
"welfare authorities and recipients have an interest in relatively
speedy resolution," a full trial-type hearing was not a constitutional
requirement at a pre-termination hearing. The Court went on to
43. Id. at 261.
44. Id. at 262-63 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 263.
46. Id. at 264.
47. Id. at 266.
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explain that the due process requirements which were minimal
for this particular case were "molded to the particular parties
involved and the particular interests represented."' 48
The Court listed the following elements of "rudimentary due
process," in Goldberg: (1) "timely and adequate notice detailing
the reasons for a proposed termination must be given to the recipi-
ent;" (2) opportunity must be given to present an oral statement
and to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (3) "recipient must
be allowed to retain an attorney" who may help in the recipient's
presentation at the oral hearing; (4) the decision made must be
based "on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing"
and the "decision maker should state the reasons for his determina-
tion and indicate the evidence he relied on;" and, (5) the decision
should be made by an impartial decision-maker.4 9
In analyzing Goldberg v. Kelly,50 Professor Davis questions
whether the Supreme Court, though stating that a full judicial
hearing was not required, did not in fact require just such a
judicial-type hearing. He indicates that the only items that the
Court did not mention were "a verbatim transcript and testimony
under oath." 51
III. DuE PROCESS IN PRISON DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
The traditional role of courts in dealing with prison affairs has
been one of self-imposed restraint-the so-called "hands off" doc-
trine.52 This doctrine was partially based on the theory that the
management of prisons was the responsibility of the executive branch
and was not to be interfered with by the judiciary.5 8 Other explana-
tions suggested for the "hands off" approach are that: (1) embar-
rassment to high officials may be caused by showing the public
the real conditions within a prison; (2) courts lack expertise in
48. These considerations justify the limitation of the pre-termination hearing to
minimum procedural safeguards, adapted to the particular characteristics of
welfare recipients, and to the limited nature of the controversies to be re-
solved. We wish to add that we, no less than the dissenters, recognize the
Importance of not Imposing upon the States or the Federal Government in
this developing field of law any procedural requirements beyond those de-
manded by rudimentary due process.
Id. at 267.
49. Id. at 268-71.
50. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
51. K. DAvis, 8upra note 4, at § 7.07, at 170.
52. For a general discussion of this doctrine see Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices
and Procedures: Is Due Process Provided? 47 N.D. L. Ra v. 1, 11-14 (1970); Note,
Decewy and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role In Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. TrEv. 841
(1971).
53. The Petitioner and other inmates of penal institutions should realize that
the penal and correctional institutions are under the control and responsi-
bility of the executive branch of the government and that courts will not
interfere with the conduct, management and disciplinary control of this type
of Institution except In extreme cases.
Douglas v.Sigler, 886 F.2d 684. 688 (1967) ; See Kraft, supra note 56, at 12.
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the area of prison management to formulate workable solutions
to the prison problems; (3) legislatures are unwilling to allocate
monies needed to make necessary improvements; and, (4) courts
do not wish to hamstring the work of prison administrators in
running the prison.54
This judicial attitude of self-restraint began to erode in certain
areas of prison administrative policy during the late 1960's.5 5 Courts
began to recognize that although a prisoner necessarily loses many
privileges when he is incarcerated, he does not lose all his consti-
tutional rights. The protections of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment specifically follow prisoners into prison and "protect
them from unconstitutional action on the part of prison authorities
carried out under color of law."56 The Supreme Court's decision
in Johnson v. Avery" was a major step in reinforcing this new
judicial attitude. The Court in Johnson struck down a prison rule
which prohibited an inmate from giving legal assistance to another
inmate. The Court stated:
[D]iscipline and administration of state detention facilities
are state functions . . . . [however] in instances where
state regulations applicable to inmates of prison facilities
conflict with [constitutional] rights, the regulations may be
invalidated.5 8
This new judicial attitude has also made its way into the area
of prison disciplinary proceedings. Many, if not all, federal courts
are now willing to establish minimum due process requirements
when previous safeguards are found to be inadequate to satisfy
the Fourteenth Amendment.
59
54. Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA.
L. REv. 841, 844-46 ((1971).
55. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 920 (1967)
Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due Process-The Requirement
Of A Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L. REv. 27, 36-37 (1971).
56. Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
57. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
58. Id. at 486, cited in Millman, supra note 55, at 37.
59. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Krause v. Schmidt,
341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972). Some federal courts are willing to promulgate rules
that must be put into effect or to order rules put into effect that have been negotiated
by the prison officials and the inmates. Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I.
1970). Other federal courts, retaining a small segment of the "hands off" doctrine, re-
fuse to promulgate rules which must be put into use by the prison officials. These courts
achieve a similar result, however, by simply specifying minimum procedures that due
process requires under the factual situation. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). Judges lack exper-
tise in the area of prison administration, and even if they didn't, It wouldn't "qualify
us as a federal court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided
is suitable because to us the choice may seem unsound or personally repugnant." Id. at
191. In at least one Federal court, the traditional "hands off" approach may still be
around. In Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062
(1972), the court refused to hold that a six month delay in granting a hearing on con-
finement in segregation was unconstitutional. The court, however, took notice of the
fact that new rules were now being used in the prison and that such a lengthy delay
would not likely happen In the future.
Judicial review is available in state prison disciplinary proceed-
ings when an individual states a cause of action showing that
he has been deprived, under color of law, of a right, privilege or
immunity "secured by the Constitution or law" of the United States.60
In determining whether Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
have been violated in such cases, the court must look to whether
the individual will be subject to "grievous loss" if he is found guilty
of violating a prison rule. 61 "Grievous loss," then, is the key to a
court's willingness to find that a trial-type proceeding is necessary
to provide due process in a given disciplinary proceeding.62 In the
prison disciplinary cases discussed hereafter, the court has in each
instance ruled that the prisoner is subject to "grievous loss" under
the Goldberg definition. 3 In most instances, this has amounted
to a loss of good time and/or placement in segregation for punitive
or administrative purposes. Therefore, the determination that will
be analyzed in these cases is not whether a potential for "grievous
loss" is present, but rather what procedural safeguards are required
by the Fourteenth Amendment after the possibility of "grievous
loss" has been found to exist.
It should be noted at the outset that some states have voluntarily
promulgated rules to meet the minimum procedural due process
requirements established by the courts for prison disciplinary pro-
ceedings." However, in many other cases, courts have merely
stated that the present due process safeguards are inadequate and
that new rules should be devised by the state.65
A. Goldberg SAFEGUARDS APPLIED TO PRISONS
One of the first major cases in the area of judicial review
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970-):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
61. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd. in part sub nomn.,
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972). The typical case has been that the inmate has already suffered
"grievous loss" by the time he brings the action, The purpose of the action, then, is to
prevent further "grievous loss' or to recover money damages or both.
62. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971). The due process procedures
mentioned in the case are necessary elements of a prison disciplinary proceeding in which
an inmate can be confined to solitary confinement, lose good time, bef transferred to
maximum security confinement, or be placed in padlock confinement for over ten days.
The court also mentioned that less due process protection was necessary when a minor
fine or punishment was possible. Id. at 654.
63. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
64. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971). The court said that there was
no need to promulgate rules within their court order since Maryland had already adopted
an adequate set of procedural due process rules. Id. at 174.
65. Inmates v. Mullaney, 12 Cairn. L. RPTR. 2379 (D. Me. Jan. 4, 1973). The court's
order included a set of newly-adopted procedural rules which satisfied due process re-
quirements.
NOTES 685
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of prison disciplinary proceedings was Sostre v. Rockefeller.6 It
dealt with an inmate who remained in segregation for more than
a year and who lost 124-1/3 days of good time during his stay
in segregation. This punishment was given to Sostre because he
refused to stop practicing law in the institution, refused to answer
questions about an organization known as the Republic of North
Africa, and refused to answer questions about a letter written to
his sister in which he said he would soon be leaving the institution.6 7
The court found that segregation for over 15 days was unconstitu-
tional in itself and that because segregation was imposed a hearing
should have been held that provided the following safeguards to
the accused:
(1) written notice of the charges against him . . . which
designated the prison rule violated;
(2) a hearing before an impartial official at which he had
a right to cross-examine his accusers and call witnesses in
rebuttal;
(3) a written record of the hearing, decision, reasons there-
fore and evidence relied upon; and
(4) retain counsel or a counsel substitute.68
Without mentioning the balancing test posed by Goldberg the Court
said:
Very recently, the Supreme Court reiterated the firmly es-
tablished due process principle that where governmental ac-
tion may seriously injure an individual, and the reasonable-
ness of that action depends on fact findings, the evidence,
used to prove the government's case must be disclosed to
the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it
is untrue. The individual must also have the right to retain
counsel. The decision-maker's conclusion must rest solely on
the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing. In this
connection, the decision-maker should state the reasons for
his determination and indicate the evidence upon which he
relied. Finally, in such cases, the high court ruled, an im-
partial decision-maker is essential.69
In Sostre v. McGinnis," the Circuit Court reversed the parts
66. Sostre V. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd. in part sub nom.,
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
67. Id. at 867-68.
68. Id. at 872.
69. Id.
70. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), Rev'g in part sub nom., Sostre
v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v. Sostre
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
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of the holding in Sostre v. Rockefeller 71 that dealt with segregation
as cruel and unusual punishment and with the requirements of
due process. The court held that segregation was not, in itself,
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
It further held that the due process requirements imposed by the
lower court's ruling were not a constitutional necessity for every
prison disciplinary proceeding in which a serious sanction may
result. 72 In deciding the due process issue the court quoted the
Hannah v. Larke8 statement that requirements of due process
in any given proceeding 'are dependent "upon a complexity of
factors?' 7 4 These factors include the interest of the party, the type
of proceeding, and the burden that certain due process requirements
will have upon the proceeding. The court then went on to balance
the rights of the individual against the burden which requiring
strict procedures would work upon the prison administration.7 5 After
applying this balancing test, the court concluded:
We therefore find ourselves in disagreement with Judge Mot-
ley's conclusion that each of the procedural elements incor-
porated in her mandatory injunction are necessary constitu-
tional ingredients of every proceeding resulting in serious
discipline of a prisoner. . . . [W] e are not to be understood
as disapproving the judgment of many courts that our con-
stitutional scheme does not contemplate that society may
commit lawbreakers to the capricious and arbitrary actions
of prison officials. If substantial deprivations are to be visited
upon a prisoner, it is wise that such action should at least be
premised on facts rationally determined. . . .In most cases
it would probably be difficult to find an inquiry minimally
fair and rational unless the prisoner were confronted with
the accusation, informed of the evidence against him, and




In Clutchette v. Procunier,"7 the court ruled that when prisoners
were subject to certain punishments, such as an increase in sentence
or indefinite confinement in segregation, procedural due process
required all of the Goldberg-type safeguards. The court quoted
71. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub noain.,
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), 644 cert. denied sub noma., Oswald v.
Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
72. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 203 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part sutb nom., Sostre
V. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied sub nora., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
73. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
74. Id. at 442.
75. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part sub nom., Sostre
v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), ce.t denied sub nom., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
76. Id.
77. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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the text from Goldberg which spoke of the need for a balancing
test78 and then stated in a footnote that Sostre v. McGinnis"9
was decided improperly because the Second Circuit Court made
use of a balancing test:
In Sostre, the Court of Appeals recognized that disciplinary
punishment constituted "grievous loss" within the meaning
of Goldberg. They framed their inquiry, however, into an
analysis of what "process" is "due," and concluded that the
requirements set out by the district court, [Sostre v. Rocke-
feller] which were similar to those set out here, were more
than that required by the due process clause. In light of the
quoted portion of Goldberg, in which the Supreme Court
held that the requirements it was about to set out (require-
ments this court is now adopting as applicable to disciplinary
hearings) did not extend "beyond those demanded by rudi-
mentary due process," it is difficult to understand the con-
clusion that something less is constitutionally adequate.80
In Krause v. Schmidt"1 a federal district court in Wisconsin
granted a preliminary injunction restoring the status quo after
prisoners suffered "grievous loss" under hearing procedures which
did not meet the standards set out in Goldberg. The court referred
to Clutchette, where prison hearing procedures were held inadequate
because they did not meet the minimum due process standards
set out in Goldberg. The court stated that it would not decide
whether the plaintiffs' hearings met the Goldberg requirements,
but that such safeguards were necessary in prison disciplinary
proceedings of that nature . 2 The court did not make use of Gold-
berg's balancing test, basing its decision on the following fallacious
syllogism:
Goldberg requires that all the minimal procedural safeguards
be present at a hearing that could result in grievous loss ...
[Pllaintiffs are "subject to grievous loss;" . . . [there-
fore] they were entitled to a hearing providing the proce-
dural minima enunciated in Goldberg .... 8
78. Id. "'[Clonsideration of what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private Interest
that has been affected by governmental action.' "
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (citation omitted).
79. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part sub nom., Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
80. Clutchette v. Procunler, 328 F. Supp. 767, 781-82 n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
81. Krause v. Schmidt, 341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
82. Id. at 1006. The relief sought was a preliminary Injunction. The court granted the
injunction but did not rule on the actual merits of the plaintiff's case.
83. Id.
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B. AN ANALYSIS OF THE MISAPPLICATION OF Goldberg
All of the prison disciplinary cases cited in the last section
dealt with situations in which the court held that a prisoner was
subject to "grievous loss" as defined in Goldberg. The real issue
then is: Did Goldberg establish minimum due process requirements
which must be applied in all cases where an individual is subject
to "grievous loss," or did Goldberg say that the requirements
used in that case were the minimum due process safeguards re-
quired under the factual situation presented?
In order to show that Goldberg only established minimum stan-
dards, it is necessary to compare that case with prison disciplinary
cases. Both Goldberg and the prison cases dealt with a decision
which was to be made primarily upon adjudicative facts. In general,
such facts call for a trial-type hearing to satisfy due process,
unless countervailing interests allow something less. One such coun-
tervailing interest is a need for summary proceedings. 84
In Goldberg the Supreme Court balanced the government's int-
erest in summary proceedings against the individual's interest in
avoiding loss due to summary action. However, a different issue
is involved in prison disciplinary proceedings. In prison disciplinary
proceedings, courts are willing to concede that the nature of the
prison setting permits the use of summary proceedings in 'emer-
gency situations if a hearing follows within a reasonable time.85
Goldberg and the prison cases deal with different variables. The
Goldberg case dealt only with a pre-termination hearing; a full
trial-type "fair hearing" was a statutory requirement after benefits
were terminated. 6 The prison disciplinary hearings involve a de-
termination of what due process safeguards are necessary when
making a final determination of the disciplinary matter before the
administrative board. 7 To "directly" apply Goldberg to the prison
disciplinary cases would be to say that due process requires a
full trial-type hearing after the initial Goldberg-type hearing has
been completed. This, of course, is an over-simplification of the
interrelated nature of the balancing processes used in determining
due process requirements. It does point out, however, that courts
involved with reviewing prison disciplinary proceedings should not
try to "directly" apply Goldberg to other factual situations without
applying a balancing test to the specific facts before the court.
84. See text accompanying notes 14 to 21 supra.
85. Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 349 F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Pa. 1972) ; Urbano v. McCorkle, 334
F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971).
86. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
87. The administrative hearing by a prison disciplinary board is a final hearing. This
is true whether or not it is held before the inmate is punished or within a reasonable
time thereafter.
689
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Goldberg was clearly limited to its particular facts. After going
through several balancing considerations, the Court stated:
These considerations justify the limitation of the pre-termi-
nation hearing to minimum-procedural safeguards, adapted
to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, and to
the limited nature of the controversies to be resolved. We
wish to add that we, no less than the dissenters, recognize
the importance of not imposing upon the States or the Federal
Government in this developing field of law any procedural
requirements beyond those demanded by rudimentary due
process."
In Clutchette,89 Krause,90 and the first Sostre91 case, the courts
assumed that the words "rudimentary due process" referred to
a conceptual due process guarantee that would be present whenever
someone was subject to "grievous loss." If such loss was present,
the Goldberg due process safeguards would automatically attach.
There are two major reasons why this analysis is unwarranted:
(1) the Goldberg court limited its decision to the exact factual
situation before it; and (2) due process does not always require
Goldberg-type protections.
In Goldberg, the Supreme Court ruled that certain "minimum
procedural safeguards" were necessary due to the "particular char-
acteristics of welfare recipients" and "the limited nature of the
controversy to be resolved. ' 92 The Court also stated that it was
dealing with "rudimentary due process" in a "developing area
of law." The Court was referring to the relatively new area of state
and federal welfare law. 98 It is unrealistic to argue that the words
"rudimentary due process" refer to anything other than "rudimen-
tary due process" under the particular facts of Goldberg. The
words do not apply to every situation in which a person may be
"condemned to suffer grievous loss."
Due process does not always require Goldberg-type protections.
The Goldberg Court stated that:
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a de-
termination of the precise nature of the government function
88. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
89. Cluchette v. Procunter, 328 P. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
90. Krause v. Schmidt, 341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
91. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd in part sub tom.,
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noa., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
92. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
93. Id.
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involved, as well as the private interest that has been af-
fected by governmental action."
If the concept were adopted that the Fourteenth Amendment re-
quired Goldberg-type standards as "rudimentary due process" in
every case, due process would no longer be a flexible tool. The
only reason a court would have for using a balancing of interests
test would be to determine if more than Goldberg-type safeguards
were needed in a certain case. Under this theory, no circumstances
could arise in which due process would demand less than a Goldberg-
type hearing.
9 5
C. WHAT DuE PROCESS REQUIRES
It should be emphasized that Goldberg has not been misapplied
in all prison disciplinary cases. 96 In Sostre v. McGinnis,9 7 the court
correctly interpreted the Goldberg case and applied the balancing
test to determine the procedure required by the Due Process Clause.
This does not mean, however, that the court gave proper weight
to all the factors that go into the balancing testY5 Furthermore,
it does not mean that the procedural safeguards set out in Sostre
v. McGinnis" are the ones that should be adopted by every federal
94. Id. at 263.
95. This theory seems quite -tenuous when one considers that some hearings require
only some or none of the Goldberg-type hearing requirements. K. DAvis, supra note 4,
at § 7.16. Professor Davis explains that a trial-type hearing should usually be afforded
to a party when adjudicative facts are in question. However, In, some cases where the
interest of the individual involved Is classified as a nrivilege or where some other coun-
tervailing Interest overrides the interest of the Individual, something less than a trial-
type hearing is required. Id. In prison cases, some courts feel that the interest of the
individual prisoner in a trial-type hearing is overridden by the interests of the state in
prison discipline and adminisration. See generally Cafeteria Workers Union v. McElroy,
367 U.S 886 (1961) (national security interest overrides the interest of the Individual in
having a hearing); Alverez v. Turner, 422 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub
norm., McDorman v. Turner, 399 U.S, 916 (1970) (due process not required for a prisoner
seeking parole).
96. Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "We believe that such
serious punishment should not be allowed to stand, at least until disciplinary procedures
are adopted that will meet rudimentary standards of due process under conditions en-
countered." Id. at 1029.
S7. Sostre v, McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Mr. 1971), rev'g in part sub nom., Sostre
v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied sub nom., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
98. The balancing test amounts to a weighing of the interest of the Individual pris-
oner in avoiding the punishment against the weighing of the interests of the prison in
avoiding trial-type hearings. The prisoner's interest is clearly that of avoiding a punish-
ment which amounts to a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. This interest is of course affected by the type of punishment being imposed aild
by the court's interpretation of what constitutional rights follow the prisoner into
prison. On the other side of the balance, the prison administrator's interests in avoiding
trial-type hearings is a matter of administrative feasibility. The prison administrators
argue that such trial-type hearings will adversely affect prison control and securitY, the
rehabilitative value of prison therapy, and the relationship which must be maintained
between the prisoners and the custodial staff. For a discussion of balancing interests
see Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment May R~e-
quire Elementary Procedural Safeguards Fo- Prisoners in Administration of Prison Dis-
cipline, 25 VAND. L. REv. 1079 (1972).
99. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part sub nom., Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied sub nora., Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
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court. Until the United States Supreme Court decides a prison
disciplinary case and promulgates general standards, federal courts
will be responsible for formulating procedural due process safe-
guards by balancing the interests of the individual against the
countervailing interests of the prison administration.100
In one recent case, Sands v. Wainwright,101 a federal district
court applied the balancing test and discussed the interests of
prison administrative officials in placing someone in administrative
or punitive segregation. The court stated that the prison officials
had two major interests in taking such action: (1) an interest
in a rehabilitative effect; and, (2) an interest in administrative
convenience. After identifying these interests, the court balanced
them against the interests of the individual in staying out of segre-
gation. It considered the interest of a prisoner in staying out of
segregation extremely important, amounting to avoidance of the
most "wretched" punishment which could legally be imposed within
a prison setting.10 2 Beyond this, the court also explained that any
prisoner in segregation was subject to loss of gain time, which in
effect, extends his sentence.10 3 The court went on to set the minimum
due process safeguards for an administrative disciplinary hearing
in which a prisoner would be subject to punitive or administrative
segregation.
D. MINIMUM DuE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS: Sands v. Wainwright
I. Impartial Tribunal
It is not a requisite that members of the disciplinary committee
be made up of individuals from outside the prison. However, persons
involved in the disciplinary proceedings who were responsible for
investigation, testifying or reviewing the decision, or who have
personal knowledge, involvement, or interest in the outcome, should
not be part of that board. No specific number of committee mem-
bers was required, although the court did rule that a three member
committee was "constitutionally permissible." 10' 4
100. The Supreme Court has already given an indication that they do not want to
review prison disciplinary cases Involving due process rights. Sostre v. McGinmlis 442 F.9,d
178 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g in part sub nor., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.T. 1970), cert. denied sub nor., Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972), Burns v.
Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972).
101. Sands v. Wainwright, 12 CRrM. L. RPTR. 2376 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 1973).
102. [E]xcept for the loss of life Itself and except for the imposition of those con-
ditions which would constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, confinement in punitive segregation is as loath-






The "right to be heard" implies that the individual will be
given the chance to explain his conduct and offer evidence to sup-
port his contentions. This includes the right to call "voluntary wit-
nesses to testify for him." 105 The "right to be heard" also implies
the right to cross-examine and confront adverse witnesses.1 6 The
Sands court acknowledged the concern that some courts have ex-
pressed about allowing cross-examination of custodial officers or
other inmates. 1'07 However, in view of the nature of the inmate's
interest, such cross-examination and confrontation is a constitutional
requirement.
3. Counsel
Some inmates are not capable of adequately representing them-
selves at a hearing. To take away the use of counsel in such cases
would actually amount to denying a hearing. The Sands court con-
cluded that, while no right to appointment of counsel is a constitu-
tional necessity, an inmate must be allowed to retain an attorney
or to have the assistance of voluntary counsel if he so desires.108
4. Decision on the Record
The decision must be based on evidence which is presented
at the hearing and must be supported by substantial evidence. The
decision-maker should briefly state the reasons for his decision
and identify the evidence on which he relied. 10 9
5. Record
A complete transcript of the proceedings is not required but
some type of record should be kept which will demonstrate that
all the procedural due process requirements have been met. The
record of the proceedings should be kept "as a part of the inmate's
record."lO
105. In so holding this court In no way limits the Inherent power of the fact
finder and decision maker . . . to restrict questions and answers to rele-
vant matter, to preserve decorum and to limit repetition.
Id. at 2377.
106. Although cross-examination is generally a vital feature of the fact finding
procedure in any tribunal, it is of fundamental importance in administra-
tive proceedings wherein the ordinary rules of evidence are relaxed.
Id.
107. Courts have expressed the idea that cross-examination of custodial officers will
cause a breakdown in the prisoner-guard relationship and will adversely affect security
within the institution. Courts have also expressed concern for the safety of Inmates who
act as witnesses for the prison officials. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
lC,. The court suggested that a tape recording of the proceedings would satisfy the
requirement of a record. Id.
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6. Appellate Review
Under the present balancing test, there is no reason why appel-
late review should be considered a constitutional requirement. But,
if prison regulations grant a review in an inmate disciplinary hearing,
"the review must be strictly confined to the record."11 1
7. Rules
Due process requires that prison rules prohibit "reasonably
specific" types of conduct and that the range of punishments be
made in advance. These written rules should be adequately com-
municated to the Inmates.
112
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals came up with due process
safeguards that are extremely different from the ones enunciated
in the Sands case. It is difficult to explain the discrepancy in
the holdings. However, possible explanations are offered by one
or both of the following rationales: (1) The federal courts have
not had sufficient time to properly analyze all of the factors which
go into making a decision as to the safeguards required by due
process in a prison disciplinary proceeding; and/or (2) the federal
courts do not agree as to the amount of weight which should be
given to the interests of the parties involved.118
Although an exacting formulation of constitutional due process
requirements which could be applied in all federal jurisdictions
for prison disciplinary hearings, cannot be concretely stated at this
time, one conclusion seems quite definite: Goldberg v. Kelly requires
that due process safeguards be formulated by balancing the inter-
ests of the individual against the "precise nature of the government-
al function involved."1 14
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Case holdings In the federal district courts and the federal courts of appeal in the
Second and Third Circuits indicate that due process in prison disciplinary hearings Is
satisfied by being notified of changes, being informed of the evidence, and being given
an opportunity to explain one's conduct. See note 98 supra; Biagiarelli v. Silaff, 349 F.
Supp. 913 (1972). Case holdings in federal courts in the First, Fourth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits indicate that a Goldberg-type hearing (and sometimes more) is required
by the Constitution. See Inmates v .Mullaney, 12 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2379 (D. Me. Jan. 4,
1973) ; Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971) ; Krause v. Schmidt, 341
F. Supp. 1001 (1972) ; Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Case
holdings in the federal courts of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits indicate that prison di%-
ciplinary hearings do not require due process safeguards. See Burns v. Swenson, 430
F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970) ; Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845 (1964). Case holdings within
the federal district courts of the Fifth Circuit indicate that the courts are not sure
what due process requirements are needed in a prison disciplinary hearings. See Sands
v. Wainwright, 12 CRiM. L. Rpm 2376 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 1973) (Goldberg-type hearing
reqquired by due process); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971)
(due process only required a set of rules governing inmate conduct, written notice of
changes, and opportunity to be heard before impartial decision maker).
114. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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IV. DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS APPLIED TO PRISON TRANSFERS
The traditional view of federal courts was that inmate transfers
from one prison to another were outside the realm of court review. 15
While this traditional "hands-off" approach still finds support,1 16
a new trend may be developing in which due process protections
will be applied to inmate transfers where the inmate is subject
to loss of a constitutionally protected interest.1'7
Gary v. Creamer"s is an example of the traditional view that
prison inmates do not have a "constitutional right to remain in
any particular prison." In that case, several inmates who had been
operating a prison newspaper were either placed in segregation or
transferred to a different penal institution. The court held that due
process safeguards were required before inmates could be placed
in segregation.1 9 The appeals court also stated that they would
not set the standards themselves, but would remand the case to
the district court to determine the necessary safeguards through
the application of a balancing test. As for the inmates who were
transferred to other institutions, the court dismissed their claim
that due process was "guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
-Amendments." The court held "that a state prisoner has no constitu-
tional right to remain in any particular prison.1
120
In the 1973 case of Gomes v. Travisono,1 2 1 a federal district
court ruled that certain due process procedures should be guaranteed
before a state prisoner could be transferred to a distant out-of-state
prison or before a state prisoner could be transferred to a distant
federal prison.12 2 The court identified certain deprivations that at-
tended transfer of the prisoners from one institution to another:
(1) these inmates were placed in administrative segregation from
two to six weeks; (2) they were placed in "work assignments
and programs" which were not in the best interests of their rehab-
ilitative development; (3) they received more "stringent" mail cen-
sorship than other inmates; (4) they were unable to see counsel
115. United States ex rel. Stuart v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1968). "Al-
though the court feels great sympathy for the plight of petitioner, it believes that no
constitutional right of petitioner is abridged by a transfer" from one state prison to
another. Id. at 1081.
116. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Suop. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
117. Gomes v. Tranisono, 12 Carm. L. RPTR. 2374 (D.R.I. Jan. 16, 1973). The new
trend may indicate that federal courts are now more willing to look for "grievous loss"
in a prison transfer. If such loss is found, then due process safeguards must be provided.
118. Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1972).
119. The hearing must be held before the inmates are placed into segregation unless
an emergency situation demands that the inmates be summarily confined to segregation.
In such situations, a hearing must follow within a reasonable time. Id. at 185.
120. Id. at 187.
A prisoner has no vested right to be assigned to or to remain in a medium
security or minimum security institution. The Division of Correction has the
right to transfer prisoners from one institution to another . . . without
the need for a hearing under those procedures.
Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 173 (D. Md. 1971).
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due to the extreme distances from their attorney's offices (up to
1,500 miles); (5) they were treated with hostility by other prisoners
because such prisoners thought the new inmates were "stool pigeons"
transferred for their own protection; and, (6) these inmates, in
general, were not allowed to take part in rehabilitative and edu-
cation programs and psychological therapy sessions.
12
3
Due to the serious nature of the deprivations that were worked
upon these inmates, the court reasoned that Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process requirements had to be met. These require-
ments included written notice of the charges, an opportunity to
present evidence, the assistance of lay counsel, a decision based
on substantial evidence, trial by an impartial tribunal, and a record
of the proceedings and findings. 1 24 It should be noted that these
procedural safeguards were arrived at by application of a balancing
test in which the interests of the parties were given the appropriate
weight demanded by the Constitution.
1'2 5
The Gomes case does not stand for the proposition that due
process requirements are necessary in every prison transfer. It
does, however, state that certain due process protections must be
given to an inmate where the nature of the institutional transfer
is such that he will be subject to the deprivation of a Fourteenth
Amendment right to life, liberty or property. The type of due process




A court's determination of due process requirements applicable
to a prison disciplinary hearing is a two step process. The first
step in this procedure is the court's determination of whether or
not the individual involved has suffered, or is subject to suffering,
a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. If such deprivation does
exist, the court must next determine the exact nature of the due
process safeguards which will satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court's decision, in this second step, is formulated by balancing
the nature of the inmate's interest against the nature of the burden
that a strict trial-type hearing will work upon the prison admini-
stration.
121. Go'mes v. Travisono, 12 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2374 (D.R.I. Jan. 16, 1973).
122. If an emergency situation dictated that an immediate transfer must be made
without a hearing, then the inmate must be returned for a hearing within a reasonable
time. Id. at 2376.
123. Id. at 2375.
124. Id.
125. "In the determination of what forms of process are due, it is appropriate to weigh




The foregoing discussion has focused on the second part of
this process. 127 It was the purpose of this note to point out the
improper reasoning that has been used by some federal district
courts in their determination of the essential due process safeguards.
This improper reasoning has been based on a misapplication of
principles that have been applied by the Supreme Court in Goldberg
v. Kelly,' 2 a case involving an administrative proceeding. The Su-
preme Court stated that certain elements of a trial-type hearing
were necessary when a welfare recipient was subjected to "grievous
loss" by a pre-termination hearing. The Court explained that the
due process safeguards, applicable in Goldberg, were determined
by balancing the interests of the parties involved and that such
principles were only applicable to the factual situation before the
Court.1 29 Despite this explanation, some federal district courts have
proceeded, without a balancing test, to require the exact procedural
safeguards applied by the Court in Goldberg.2 0 In some cases,
this process may have provided procedural safeguards which would
not have been granted if a balancing test had been used. However,
some recent cases indicate that an application of the Goldberg
balancing test to prison disciplinary proceedings will bring about
trial-type procedures equal to, or beyond, those formulated in the
Goldberg case.23 Whether or not such a trend materializes, remains
to be seen. In the mean time, it is important that federal district
courts, when reviewing prison disciplinary cases, apply the balancing
test enunciated in Goldberg rather than making a blanket applica-
tion of the due process safeguards which were applicable only
under the Goldberg factual situation.
DAVID S. MARING*
127. Most cases cited in this note were cases in which the court made a determination,
in step one, that an Individual was subject to a deprivation of a Fourteenth Amendment
Constitutional right. If such deprivation was not found, the court would not have to
require due process safeguards.
128. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
129. Id.
130. Krause v. Schmidt, 341 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Wis. 1972) ; Clutchette v. Procunier,
328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
131. Sands v. Wainwright, 12 CalM. L. RPTR. 2376 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 1973); Gomes v.
Travisono, 12 CRIM. L. RPTR. 2374 (D.R.I. Jan. 16, 1973).
* The author of this note spent a summer working as a Federal Correctional Intern
at the Federal Youth Centbr in Englewood, Colorado.
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